This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The role of social and economic networks in shaping individual behavior and aggregate phenomena has received increasing attention in recent years. This work has been accompanied by research of sociologists, economists and physicists into the character of actual networks. This research shows that communication networks, scientific collaboration net-works, social networks and the web exhibit high levels of centrality and small average distances. 1 This widespread stability of centrality and small distances has led researchers to develop theories of network formation which can explain these features.
The connections model proposed in Bala and Goyal (2000a) offers a simple framework for the study of network formation. 2 In this model there is a set of players who each gain from accessing other players. Player 1 can access player 2 directly by forming a link; this link also allows player 1 access to other players that player 2 is accessing on his own. We will suppose that the link formed by 1 with 2 creates a similar flow of benefits to 2. 3 Bala and Goyal (2000a) show that if a player's payoffs are increasing in the number of other players accessed and decreasing in the number of links formed, then an equilibrium network can have only one of two possible structures: it is either a center-sponsored star (a network in which one player, the center, forms links with all the other players) or the empty network (which has no links). We note that a star exhibits high centrality and short distances between individuals. In this paper we examine the impact of ex ante player heterogeneity on these findings.
Ex ante asymmetries arise quite naturally in many contexts. For instance, in the context of information networks it is often the case that some individuals are more interested in particular issues (such as computer software) and therefore better informed which makes them more valuable as contacts. Similarly, individuals differ in communication and social skills. Finally, individuals can often be classified into distinct groups (based on geographical or cultural reasons) and forming links within a group is cheaper as compared to forming links across groups.
We start with a general model of heterogeneous players: the costs to player i of a link with player j as well as the benefits of such a link are allowed to depend on both i and j . In addition, we assume that the length of the path does not matter in defining the benefits (there is no decay). We first consider a particular form of cost heterogeneity: for any player i the costs of forming links with every other player are c i but we allow this cost to vary across players. In this setting we find that if benefits are homogeneous then a strict equilibrium is either an empty network or a center-sponsored star. By contrast, if values are heterogeneous then partially connected networks can also arise, though each (nonsingleton) component constitutes a center-sponsored star (Proposition 3.1). These results 1 See Rogers and Kincaid (1981) for networks of communication, Goyal et al. (2004) for co-authorship networks in economics and Newman (2001) for co-authorship networks in other subjects, Burt (1992) for work on social networks, Albert and Barabási (2002) for evidence on the architecture of the World Wide Web.
2 There are two versions of the connections model: the case where individual players can form links unilaterally was introduced in Bala and Goyal (2000a) and Goyal (1993) , while the case where links are formed based on bilateral agreement was introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . The term connections model is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . Both the versions have been extensively studied in the literature. Theoretical work on this model includes Bala and Goyal (2000b) , Deroian (2003) , Dutta and Jackson (2000) , Feri (2004a Feri ( , 2004b , Haller and Sarangi (2001) and Watts (2001) . There have also been several experimental tests of the predictions of the connections model; see e.g. Falk and Kosfeld (2003) , Callander and Plott (2004) and Goeree et al. (2004) . 3 Examples which can be interpreted in this spirit are telephone calls in which people exchange information, investments in personal relationships which create a social tie yielding value to both partners, and the creation of blogs (short for web log). When a blog user i enters another blog user j , he or she can leave a comment and this automatically creates a link from j to i.
suggest that heterogeneity in benefits is important in determining the level of connectedness of a network. We then move to a model with general cost heterogeneity where costs of forming links vary across individuals and in addition for the same individual the costs of forming links are sensitive to the identity of the potential partner. In this setting we obtain the following equivalence result: a strict equilibrium network is minimal and conversely every minimal network is a strict equilibrium for suitable costs and benefits. We also find that this equivalence obtains even if benefits are restricted to be homogeneous (Proposition 3.2). Taken together these results suggest that cost heterogeneity is important in shaping the level of connectedness of networks as well as the architecture of individual components. These results also clarify the role of different forms of cost heterogeneity and in particular imply that the 'everything is possible' nature of our equivalence result is closely related to cost heterogeneity which arises when the costs of linking vary for the same player. This last finding on the impact of cost heterogeneity leads us to ask: Does strategic link formation have something to say in settings with restricted types of cost heterogeneity? This question is the motivation behind the insider-outsider model where the society is composed of distinct groups. The cost of forming a link between two players is (weakly) increasing in the distance between the groups to which the two players belong. Thus, the distance among groups may be interpreted as the degree of heterogeneity across players.
We start with a study of a static model with no decay. In this setting, we obtain two main results. Our first result is a complete characterization of strict Nash equilibrium networks. It shows that an equilibrium network is either a center-sponsored star or a variation of this architecture (Proposition 4.1). 4 Figure 1 depicts all the strict Nash architectures in a society composed of two groups.
Our second result is about efficient networks. In the insider-outsider model, it is clear that an efficient network must minimize the number of outsider links since they are costlier as compared to insider links. Thus in a society with 2 groups an efficient connected network has each group entirely internally linked and 1 outside link (Proposition 4.2). By contrast, a (connected) strict equilibrium network is a generalized center-sponsored star, 5 with n − n l outsider links (where n l is the number of players in the core group). If there are 2 groups and 50 players in each group then an efficient network has 98 insider links and 1 outsider link, while a strict equilibrium network has 49 insider links and 50 outsider links! The relative abundance of across group links is a reflection of the center-sponsorship property of the network. This leads us to examine the robustness of the equilibrium predictions.
We do this by examining the role of a small amount of decay. We show that a strict equilibrium always exists and stars (and variants of stars) are prominent in equilibrium networks. However, we also find that center-sponsorship is not the only way a star can arise 4 The following phenomenon which is widely observed corresponds to center-sponsorship: one friend acts as a host to a social gathering in which friends are invited. The host (center) sponsors the invitations (centersponsorship) and the social gathering offers an opportunity for sharing information and goods (two-way flow of benefits). A specific example of this is mentioned in Rappaport (1968) ; he points out that in the Maring tribe of New Guinea periodically one clan acts as a host (center-sponsorship) to a big feast in which all neighboring clans participate (two-way flow of benefits). 5 This network is formally defined in Section 4. in equilibrium; there is a much wider range of parameters for which periphery-sponsorship prevails in equilibrium (Proposition 4.3). 6 Periphery-sponsorship is intimately related to another feature of equilibrium networks: the existence of stars constituted of members of a single group. Group-based stars minimize inter-group links and this suggests that there is considerable overlap between equilibrium and efficient networks, in the presence of a small amount of decay. We summarize our findings as follows: even in settings with considerable heterogeneity, strategic models of network formation yield sharp predictions and equilibrium networks exhibit high centrality and small average distances.
The theory of network formation is a very active area of research currently. 7 Most of the existing literature focuses on homogeneous player models; we now briefly discuss three other papers which examine heterogeneity. Johnson and Gilles (2000) considers two-sided link formation in a model where individuals are located in an interval and costs of links are increasing in the distance between players. McBride (2004) focuses on value heterogeneity and partial information about network structure. In a subsequent paper Hojman and Szeidl (2003) develop a general model of decay and show that periphery-sponsorship is a robust feature of equilibrium networks. In contrast to these papers, the focus of the present paper is on the impact of different forms of heterogeneity on the architecture of equilibrium networks. We first show that value heterogeneity is not important while cost heterogeneity is critical in shaping equilibrium network architectures. This motivates the study of network formation in a model of restricted cost heterogeneity, the insider-outsider model. We find that centrality and short-average distances are features of equilibrium networks in the insider-outsider model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents results on equilibrium networks under general cost and value heterogeneity. Section 4 analyzes an insider-outsider model, while Section 5 concludes.
The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players and let i and j be typical members of this set. We shall assume throughout that the number of players is n 3. Each player is assumed to possess some information of value to himself and to other players. He can augment 6 Periphery-sponsored centrality is widely observed empirically. We present three examples to illustrate this.
The first example is rural communication networks. Rogers and Kincaid (1981) present communication networks from rural areas in different parts of the world. One of the distinctive features of these networks is the presence of a few very well connected people (stars). In these examples the average person connects with these well connected people (periphery-sponsorship). The second example is the World Wide Web. Albert and Barabási (2002) report that the Web exhibits high centrality and short average distances (within the core set of nodes). This high centrality arises because some nodes have very high number of outgoing links (center-sponsorship) while some nodes have very high number of incoming links (periphery-sponsorship). A third example is the network of telephone calls. Albert and Barabási (2002) report that these networks also exhibit high centrality with some nodes having a very large number of periphery sponsored links.
7 See e.g. Aumann and Myerson (1988) , Jackson and Watts (2002) , Kranton and Minehart (2001) , Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) ; also see the other references in footnote 2.
his information by communicating with other people; this communication takes resources, time and effort and is made possible via pair-wise links. A strategy of player i ∈ N is a (row) vector g i = (g i,1 , . . . , g i,i−1 , g i,i+1 , . . . , g i,n ) where g i,j ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ N \ {i}. We say that player i has a link with j if g i,j = 1. A link between player i and j can allow for either one-way (asymmetric) or two-way (symmetric) flow of information. We assume throughout the paper that a link g i,j = 1 allows both players to access each other's information. The set of strategies of player i is denoted by G i . Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to pure strategies. Since player i has the option of forming or not forming a link with each of the remaining n − 1 players, the number of strategies of player i is clearly |G i | = 2 n−1 . The set G = G 1 × · · · × G n is the space of pure strategies of all the players.
A strategy profile g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) can be represented as a directed network. Let g ∈ G. We use g − g i,j to refer to the network obtained when a link g i,j = 1 is deleted from g. To describe information flows, it is useful to define the closure of g: this is a non-directed network denotedḡ =cl(g) whereḡ i,j = max{g i,j , g j,i } for each i and j in N. 8 Pictorially, the closure of a network simply means replacing every directed edge of g by a non-directed one. We say there is a path in g between i and j if eitherḡ i,j = 1 or there exist players j 1 , . . . , j m distinct from each other and i and j such that {ḡ i,j 1 = · · · =ḡ j m ,j = 1}. We write iḡ ↔ j to indicate a path between i and j in g. Furthermore, a path between i and j is said to be i-oriented if either g i,j = 1 or there is a sequence of distinct players i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n with the property that: Given a network g, we define a component as a set C(g) ⊂ N such that ∀i, j ∈ C(g) there exists a path between them and there does not exist a path between ∀i ∈ C(g) and an player k ∈ N \ C(g). Given a network g, let #C(g) be the number of components in g. A network g is said to be minimal if #C(g) < #C(g − g i,j ), for any g i,j = 1. Moreover a network g is said to be connected if it is composed of only one component, i.e. #C(g) = 1. If this component is minimal, then g is said to be minimally connected. Finally, network g is partially connected if it is neither empty nor connected.
We note that center-sponsored star, g css , is a network architecture in which one player forms links with each of the other (n − 1) players and there are no other links.
To complete the definition of a normal-form game of network formation, we specify the payoffs. Let V i,j denote the benefits that player i derives from accessing player j . Similarly, let c i,j denote the cost for player i of forming a link with player j . The payoff to player i in a network g can be written as follows:
We shall assume that c i,j > 0 and
Given a network g ∈ G, let g −i denote the network obtained when all of player i's links are removed. Note that the network g −i can be regarded as the strategy profile where i chooses not to form a link with anyone. The network g can be written as g = g i ⊗ g −i where '⊗' indicates that g is formed as the union of the links in g i and g −i . The strategy g i is said to be a best response of player i to g −i if:
The set of all of player i's best responses to g −i is denoted by
i.e. players are playing a Nash equilibrium. If a player has multiple best responses to the equilibrium strategies of the other players then this could make the network less stable as the player can switch to a payoff equivalent strategy. This switching possibility in nonstrict Nash networks has been exploited and has been shown to be important in refining the set of equilibrium networks in earlier work (see e.g. Bala and Goyal, 2000a) . So we will focus on strict Nash equilibria in the present paper. A strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where each player gets a strictly higher payoff from his current strategy than he would with any other alternative strategy.
We now define social welfare and efficiency of a network. There are different ways of measuring efficiency; we follow the convention in this literature and focus on the sum of payoffs of all players. Formally, given a network g, its welfare, W : G → R, can be stated as follows:
A network is said to be efficient if W (g) W (g ) for any g ∈ G. Our notion of efficiency is equivalent to the concept of strong efficiency in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . 9
General heterogeneity
In this section we shall study the scope of individual incentives in restricting network architectures in a setting of general costs and value heterogeneity. Our main finding is that value heterogeneity is important in determining the connectedness of a network while heterogeneity in costs matters both for the level of connectedness as well as for the architecture of individual components of a network.
We start with a consideration of a setting in which players may differ in their costs of forming links but the costs of forming links for an individual are independent of the potential partner. Our first result establishes an equivalence between the set of center-sponsored star networks and the set of strict equilibrium networks if values are homogeneous. On the other hand, if values are allowed to vary freely then we find an equivalence between the set of minimal networks in which non-singleton components are center-sponsored stars and the set of strict equilibrium networks.
Proposition 3.1. Let payoffs satisfy (1) and suppose c i, Proof. We note first that any equilibrium network is minimal; this follows from the no decay assumption. We next show that if c i,j = c i , ∀j ∈ N then any non-singleton component C(g) in a strict equilibrium network g must be a center-sponsored star. If there are two players in this component then the claim is obviously true. So let us consider a component with 3 or more players. Without loss of generality there is a pair of players i and j such that g i,j = 1. We note that player i cannot access any other player k via this link with player j . If there were such a player then since c i,j = c i , ∀j ∈ N , player i would be indifferent between linking with j and k and g would not be a strict equilibrium. We next note that no such player k forms a link with i. If k formed a link with i then k would in turn be indifferent between linking with i and j . Combining these observations it follows that player i must be forming links with all players in the component and so it constitutes a center-sponsored star. We next take up the cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous values, respectively.
First, we consider the case of homogeneous values. Suppose g is a non-empty (strict) equilibrium network. We will show that it is connected. Let C 1 (g) be a non-singleton component in g and let j / ∈ C 1 (g). From above it follows that there exists a player i ∈ C 1 (g) who is central and sponsors all links in C 1 (g). Since g is a strict equilibrium, this implies that c i < V . The marginal payoff to forming a link with j is at least V , and so player i can increase his payoff by forming an additional link, contradicting the hypothesis that g is in equilibrium. Thus g is connected and we have proved that if values are homogeneous then an equilibrium network is either empty or a center-sponsored star. We now take up the converse case. The empty network is a (strict) equilibrium if c i > V for all i, while a center-sponsored star with i at the center is a (strict) equilibrium if c i < V .
Second, we consider the case of heterogeneous values. From the above arguments it follows that any component in a non-empty (strict) equilibrium network must be a center-sponsored star. We now prove the converse. Fix some minimal network g in which every (non-singleton) component is a center-sponsored star. Let there be m components in this network,
It follows that the links of i are optimal while no additional links are profitable for any player x ∈ C 1 (g). Since C 1 (g) was arbitrary, the proof follows. 2
The above result illustrates the role of value heterogeneity in defining the level of connectedness of networks: homogeneous values ensure connectedness of networks, while heterogeneity can generate partially connected networks. We next note that the introduction of cost heterogeneity decreases the multiplicity of equilibria. Indeed, only players who have a sufficiently low cost of linking can be at the center of a center-sponsored star network. We finally note that c i = c is a special case of the above result. This tells us that the results on equilibrium networks with homogeneous costs and values obtained in Bala and Goyal (2000a) can in fact be generalized to allow for heterogeneity in costs of forming links across individuals. Is this also true if costs of forming links are different for the same individual, depending on the potential partner? The following proposition shows that matters are quite complicated in this case. Proof. Minimality follows directly from the no decay assumption. We now prove the converse. Fix some minimal network g. We set the costs and values as follows: V i,j = V , ∀i, j ∈ N and for any link g i,j = 1, let the corresponding cost c i,j = < V , while for any link g i,j = 0, set the corresponding cost c i,j > (n − 1)V . The proof follows. 2
This result shows that if costs of forming links for an individual vary across partners and costs of forming links are different for different players then strategic interaction imposes no restrictions on network architecture. We also note that the proof of the second part of the result actually uses homogeneous values to support arbitrary minimal networks. This shows that, in case of general cost heterogeneity, the level of value heterogeneity plays no important role in determining network architecture. We summarize our analysis of the general heterogeneity model in Table 1 .
This table tells us that value heterogeneity is important in determining the level of connectedness of networks. We also observe that cost heterogeneity is important in shaping both the level of connectedness as well as the architecture of individual components. Finally, this table also highlights the significance of different forms of cost heterogeneity in shaping networks. In particular it implies that the 'everything is possible' nature of our equivalence result is closely related to cost heterogeneity which arises when the costs of linking vary for the same player. This finding motivates an examination of settings with specific types of cost-heterogeneity. 
An insider-outsider model
In this section we consider a society in which individuals are divided into pre-specified groups, and the costs of forming links within the groups is lower as compared to costs of forming links across groups. This leads to a model in which costs of linking are partner specific. We start with a basic static model with no decay and provide a complete characterization of equilibrium and efficient networks. We then examine the robustness of the findings to decay and dynamics. Our main finding is that centrality and small distance are robust features of equilibrium networks.
We consider a society composed of m groups. Let N l be the set of players belonging to group l and let n l be the cardinality of this set, i.e. n l = |N l |, l = 1, 2, 3, . . . , m. The set of players is then N ≡ m l=1 N l . We assume perfect symmetry in value across individuals and we normalize it to one, i.e. V i,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ N . 10 To allow for cost heterogeneity we consider a spatial cost structure: groups can be ordered in a line according to some well defined characteristics. The distance between two groups can be interpreted as a measure of the heterogeneity that distinguishes them. Given two players i ∈ N l and j ∈ N k , the cost of forming a link g i,j , is:
If i and j belong to the same group we let:
We shall assume that f (·) is (weakly) increasing in its argument and c L > 0. We note two interesting cases of our specification. First, when f (0) = f (1) = · · · = f (m − 1) = c the insider-outsider model degenerates in the linear payoff model presented in Bala and Goyal (2000a) . Second, if we assume that f (d) = c H , ∀d 1, and f (0) = c L < c H , we then have a two-cost levels model: the cost of creating an outside link across groups, c H , is higher than the cost of creating an inside link within a group, c L .
Let k (i; g) . In other words, µ d,k i (g) represents the number of links initiated by i with members of group k. Hence, given a network g and a player i ∈ N l , the payoff function described by (1) can be rewritten as follows:
We now develop some additional notation. Given a network g, we say that two players i, i ∈ N l are internally linked if either g i,i = 1 or there exists a group of distinct players {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } where i x ∈ N l for any x ∈ {1, . . . , k} such thatḡ i,i 1 =ḡ i 1 ,i 2 = · · · = g i k ,i = 1. A group N l is entirely internally linked if every pair of players i, i ∈ N l is internally linked. Similarly, a pair of players i, i is externally linked if g i,i = 0 and there 10 This normalization simplifies the statement of our results; on occasion this normalization can create some confusion between the notions of component value and component size. For instance, our statements relating costs of forming links with specific networks are clearly restrictions on component value and not on component size alone.
exists a group of distinct players {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k } where j x / ∈ N l for any x ∈ {1, . . . , k} such thatḡ i,j 1 =ḡ j 1 ,j 2 = · · · =ḡ j k ,i = 1. A group N l is entirely externally linked if every pair of players i, i ∈ N l is externally linked. Finally, let the diameter of a non-singleton component C(g) be defined as the length of the largest geodesic distance between any pair of players belonging to it, i.e. D(C(g)) = max i,j ∈C(g) d(i, j ; C(g)). 11 We now define some network architectures that arise in this model. Definition 4.1. A generalized center-sponsored star is a minimally connected network which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) There is a group l 0 and a player i 0 ∈ N l 0 , such that g i 0 ,j = 1, ∀j ∈ N l 0 \ {i 0 }.
(ii) For any j ∈ N , i 0ḡ ←→ j , is an i 0 -oriented path. (iii) Consider an i 0 -oriented path, i 0 , i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n with
We note that a generalized center-sponsored star will have the feature that along any path starting from the central player there can be at most m players. Thus the diameter of any such network is at most 2m, which is independent of the size of the society and only depends on the number of groups. We shall use g gcs to refer to any generalized center-sponsored star network. A network in which each group constitutes a distinct center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) star and there are no links across groups has the unconnected center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) stars architecture. We shall use g ucs (g ups ) to refer to any network with this architecture.
Our first result provides a complete characterization of strict Nash networks in the insider-outsider model. 11 Given two players i and j in g, the geodesic distance, d(i, j ; g), is defined as the length of the shortest path between them. 12 We note that weak equilibria always exist in the insider-outsider model: in case (2b) a network in which each group forms a star and the centers of the stars are linked is a weak equilibrium. Moreover, all equilibria are weak in this case. Figure 1 illustrates the different strict Nash architectures for a society with two groups of three players each (n 1 = n 2 = 3). 13 In this figure a bold line on a link next to a player indicates that this player has formed the link and pays for the link. We note that strict equilibrium networks have very specific architectures and thus strictness is a useful refinement. We discuss some aspects of this characterization result. The first remark is about insider and outsider links. Our result shows that in connected equilibria there is one group, the core group, which is entirely internally linked, while all other groups are entirely externally linked. In other words, the formation of local connections is not allowed in equilibrium (except for one group). Two, we note that the diameter of connected strict equilibrium networks is independent of the number of players, and depends only on the number of groups. Thus we expect equilibrium networks to have a relatively short diameter.
The third observation concerns the centrality and center-sponsorship properties. If the strict Nash network is connected, there is a player i such that all paths are oriented toward him. Hence, this player plays a particularly central role in the network. Furthermore, if the strict Nash network is non-empty but unconnected, then each component consists of members of one group and it has the center-sponsored star structure. Therefore, centrality and center-sponsorship are prominent properties of equilibrium networks.
We now turn to the issue of efficiency. We first introduce some new terminology that will be used in the proposition below. Let g mc refer to a minimally connected network with each group N l forming a minimally connected component with n l − 1 inside links and (m − 1) outside links of distance one. Finally, a partially connected network with each group generating a minimally connected component will be denoted as g pc m .
13 In this figure we assume that f (1) > f (0). The following result provides a complete characterization of efficient networks for the case of equal group sizes. 14 Let n l = n for all l = 1, 2, . . . , m; moreover, we define c 1 = mn 2 and c 2 = [mn(mn − 1) (4) and (5) hold. In addition suppose that n l = n, ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose
(1) Suppose c L ∈ (0, n). If f (1) ∈ (c L , c 1 ) the network g mc is uniquely efficient, while if f (1) > c 1 then the network g pc m is uniquely efficient. (2) Suppose c L ∈ (n,
mn). If f (1) ∈ (c L , c 2 ) then the network g mc is uniquely efficient, while if f (1) > c 2 then the empty network is uniquely efficient. (3) If c L > mn then the empty network is uniquely efficient.
Figure 2 illustrates an efficient architecture for a society composed of three groups each of which contains 3 players.
We have shown that if g mc is efficient the corresponding set of strict Nash networks does not contain any architectures compatible with the efficient one. This conflict persists until the level of f (1) is such that any outside link is not beneficial both from an individual and social point of view. When this is the case, our problem degenerates in a sum of independent homogeneous problems leading to unconnected center-sponsored stars networks. It follows that the trade-off between efficiency and stability fades in this case.
The role of decay
In the basic model, we assume that the transmission of value is independent of the length of the path between players. In this section we examine the robustness of our findings to the presence of decay. A general analysis of decay is outside the scope of the present paper. We will consider the case of small levels of decay and we will focus on the case of two groups. Our principal finding is that centrality and small distances are salient properties 14 If we allow groups having different sizes a variety of efficient networks arise. However, the architectural properties of these networks are qualitatively the same as in the case of equal size. To illustrate this consider the two-cost levels case in a society composed of a small group and two large groups. Let g be an efficient network. When c L is low enough each group is entirely internally linked in g. Furthermore, when c H is low enough g is connected. For moderate level of c H the two large groups are connected while the small group is left isolated. Finally, for sufficiently high level of c H each group is isolated. of equilibrium networks while center-sponsorship is not a robust feature of equilibrium networks in the presence of decay.
We measure the level of decay by a parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Given a network g it is assumed that if the shortest path between agent i and j has q 1 links, then the value of j 's information to i is δ q . The costs of forming links still take the form (4) and the payoff (5) to player i ∈ N l in a network g can be rewritten as follows:
where l, k = 1, 2 and l = k. A network in which each group constitutes a star and a single player i of group l forms a link with the central player j of group l , l = l, is referred to as an interlinked stars network. If each star is center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) we will say that the network is an interlinked center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) stars. A one group periphery-sponsored star is a partially connected network where one group forms a periphery-sponsored star, while the other group is empty. Proposition 4.3. Suppose (4) and (6) hold. In addition suppose that there are two groups and that n l = n 3, ∀l = 1, 2. Figure 3 illustrates the strict equilibria presented in part 2 of the above proposition. We first observe that the introduction of a small amount of decay does not undermine the structural properties such as centrality and short diameter, which were derived in case of perfect information flow. However, in contrast with the perfect information flow case, here we note that local connections are allowed for any group. This is closely related to the idea that peripheral players may invest in connections while in the model without decay only central players invest in connections. Secondly, we note that since the efficiency results derived in Proposition 4.2 are strict, they also hold when a small amount of decay is introduced. Thus, our analysis suggests that some decay in flow of benefits can potentially serve to enhance social efficiency. 15 Fig. 3 . Strict Nash under decay (n 1 = n 2 = 3).
Conclusion
We have studied a connections model of network formation in which players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. We start by showing that value heterogeneity across players is crucial in determining the connectedness of a network, while differences in costs of linking across players are crucial in shaping both the level of connectedness as well as the architecture of individual components in a network. We then explore an insider-outsider model in which it is cheaper to form intra-group links as compared to inter-group links. Our main finding here is that properties such as centrality and short distances are robust features of equilibrium networks. Moreover, we find that equilibrium networks are also socially efficient in many instances.
is a sequence of distinct players {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n } with the property that: {g i,i 1 = g i 1 ,i 2 = 1, . . . , g i n ,j = 1}. The proof consists of a sequence of steps, which are covered in the following lemmas. Lemma 1. Suppose g is a strict Nash network. If g i,j = 1, where i ∈ N l and j ∈ N l , l = l , then i does not access any player j via the link g i,j = 1 where j ∈ N k and k is such that |l − k| |l − l |.
Proof. Consider a strict Nash network g. Choose i ∈ N l and j ∈ N l , l = l , such that g i,j = 1. Let j ∈ N k where k is such that |l − k| |l − l |. Suppose i accesses j via the link g i,j = 1. The spatial cost structure implies that i can do at least as well by deleting his link with j and forming a link with j . This contradicts strict Nash. 2 Lemma 2. Suppose g is a strict Nash network. Assume g i,j 0 = 1, i ∈ N l , j ∈ N l 0 , l = l 0 and let {j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j k } where j x ∈ N l x for any x ∈ {0, . . . , k}, be the set of players who agent i accesses via the link g i,j 0 = 1, then g j ,i = 0, ∀j ∈ N k such that |k − l| |k − l x | for some x ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Proof. Suppose g j ,i = 1. Since the cost of forming links is non-decreasing in the distance between players' groups, j can do at least as well by deleting his link with i and forming a link with j x . This contradicts strict Nash. 2 Lemma 3. Suppose n l 2, ∀l = 1, . . . , m and that g is a strict Nash network, then in any non-singleton component there exists a pair of players who belong to the same group (this group will differ across components) and have a direct link.
Proof. Consider a non-singleton component C(g).
There exists g i,j = 1, i ∈ N l and j ∈ N \ {i}. Suppose that j ∈ N l , l = l . We first note that, given g i,j = 1, it must be true that N l ⊂ C(g). This follows by noting that the returns to a player k ∈ N l from linking with component C(g) are strictly greater than the returns to player i, while the costs are strictly smaller (since k forms a link with i). Hence every player k ∈ N l must belong to C(g). Therefore i ∈ N l must access every i ∈ N l in g. Lemma 1 implies that i cannot access i via j ; thus, i accesses i via a player j , where g j ,i = 1. Because each group consists of at least 2 players and player i was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that every player belonging to C(g) receives at least one link. Therefore, there are at least |C(g)| links sponsored in C(g), which implies that C(g) is not minimal. This contradicts that g is Nash. Hence, the proof follows. 2 Lemma 4. Assume n l 2, ∀l = 1, . . . , m. Suppose g is a non-empty strict Nash network.
Proof. Consider a non-singleton component, C(g). Given the argument in Lemma 3, if g i,i = 1, for i, i ∈ N l , then N l ⊂ C(g). We first note that, if g i,i = 1, then g i ,i = 0, ∀i ∈ N l \ {i}. This follows from the standard switching argument: if g i ,i = 1 then player i is indifferent between linking with i and i , and g is therefore not a strict Nash network. We now have two possible configurations. First, suppose that N l ≡ C(g). Then an application of the switching argument immediately implies that g i,i = 1, for all i ∈ N l . Second, suppose N l C(g). Since C(g) is connected, there is a path between i and i , and d(i, i ) 2. Then there is some player j = i such thatḡ i,j = 1. Suppose that j ∈ N l . If g i,j = 1 then a simple switching argument applies with regard to player i and this contradicts the hypothesis that g is strict Nash. If g j,i = 1 then the switching argument applies to player j , who is indifferent between the link with i and the link with i . This contradicts the hypothesis that g is strict Nash. Similar arguments can be used in the case that j / ∈ N l to complete the proof of this lemma. 2 Lemma 5. Assume n l 2, ∀l = 1, . . . , m. Suppose g is a connected strict Nash network and let i ∈ N l be the player identified by Lemma 4. Then any path iḡ ←→ j , ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, is i-oriented.
Proof. Let g be a strict Nash network which is connected. Since g is minimal, every path starting at i ends with a well defined end-player. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose there is a path ending with player j , which is not i-oriented. Ifḡ i,j = 1 and j is not i-oriented then g j,i = 1. From Lemma 4 we infer then that j ∈ N l where l = l. Next, since n l 2, we can apply a switching argument for player j with respect to some i ∈ N l , and that contradicts the hypothesis that g is a strict Nash network.
Suppose next thatḡ i,j = 0. Let {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , . . . , i n }, be the players on the path between i and j , withḡ i,i 1 = · · · =ḡ i n ,j = 1. We first take up the case g j,i n = 1. Let j ∈ N x ; if i n / ∈ N x then a simple switching argument with regard to player j and some member of group x implies that g is not a strict Nash network. If i n ∈ N x , there are two possibilities: (i) g i n−1 ,i n = 1 and (ii) g i n ,i n−1 = 1. In the first case, player i n−1 is indifferent between a link with player i n and a link with player j . This contradicts the hypothesis that g is a strict Nash network. In the second case, there are two sub-cases: suppose i n and i n−1 belong to the same group; then a switching argument applies to player j , with respect to players i n and i n−1 . If i n and i n−1 belong to different groups then a switching argument applies to player i n with regard to members of the group of i n−1 (given that n l 2, for all l = 1, 2, . . . , m).
Consider finally the case g i n ,j = 1. Let k be the first player along the path {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n }, such that g k,k−1 = 1. Let i k−1 ∈ N y . Since g k−2,k−1 = 1 by hypothesis, Lemma 1 implies that i k , i k+1 , . . . , i n / ∈ N y . By hypothesis, n y 2, and so there is a player p ∈ N y , p = i k−1 , and we know that p / ∈ {i k , i k+1 , . . . , i, j}. This is true because otherwise i k−2 can switch from i k−1 to p. Thus, p ∈ N \ {i k−1 , i k , . . . , i n , j}. In this case however, a switching argument would apply to player i k with regard to p. Hence g is a not a strict Nash network. This contradiction completes the proof of the lemma. 2 Lemma 6. Assume n l 2, ∀l = 1, . . . , m. Suppose g is a connected strict Nash network. Then D(g) 2m.
Proof. This follows directly by Lemmas 1, 3, 4 and 5. 2
We now complete the proof of Proposition 4.1.
(1) Consider a strict Nash network g and suppose c L > 1. We claim that the only strict Nash network is the empty one. Suppose that there exists a non-singleton component C(g). Using arguments from Lemma 3 it follows that if i ∈ N l , and g i,j = 1, then
it is easy to show by applying the switching argument that C(g) is a center-sponsored star. However, this is impossible given the hypothesis that c L > 1. If on the other hand, C(g) contains players from more than one group then it follows that g is a connected network. Lemma 5 now implies that there is central player and that all paths are oriented towards this player. However, given that f (1) c L > 1, this is not sustainable in equilibrium. This contradicts the hypothesis that g is a strict Nash equilibrium. Hence the empty network is the only possible strict Nash network. From Lemmas 3 and 4 it follows that either g has m components corresponding to each of the groups or it is connected. In the former case, Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that each of the components is a center-sponsored star. In the latter case, Lemma 5 implies that g has a central player and all the paths are oriented towards this player. But then the argument from (2b) applies and such a network cannot arise in equilibrium given
Proof of Proposition 4.2. In this proposition we assume equal group size, i.e. n l = n for any l = 1, . . . , m. We first start with two observations: (a) The no-decay assumption implies that each non-singleton component part of an efficient architecture is minimal; (b) If g is efficient and non-empty then it is either minimally connected with m − 1 outside links of 'length' one and mn − m inside links, or partially connected with each group generating a minimally connected component. This observation follows by the assumption of equal group size and by the definition of efficiency concept. If a link between two members of the same group is socially efficient, then, from a societal point of view, each group should be internally linked. Furthermore, the assumption of equal group sizes implies that each group internally linked contributes equally to the total social welfare produced by the network. It follows that if an outside link is social enhancing, then an efficient network should be minimally connected. Moreover, since the definition of efficiency requires the minimization of the total cost of information flow, a connected efficient network should have m − 1 outside links, each of them which requires a cost equal to f (1). Using these observations we compare three different architectures:
(1) The social welfare from g mc , is given by:
(2) The social welfare from g pc m , is given by:
(3) The social welfare from g e is given by:
First, we compare g Proof of Proposition 4.3. The proof of parts (1) and (3) is straightforward and omitted. We provide a proof of part (2). We first observe that as δ is close 1 an equilibrium network is minimal. Second, we observe that if g i,j = 1, for some i ∈ N l , j ∈ N \ {i}, then group N l is connected. Suppose not, then the payoff to a player i ∈ N l \ {i} from sponsoring a link with player i is strictly higher than the payoff obtained by player i. Third, it is immediate that the empty network is always a strict equilibrium if c L > 1. In what follows we focus on non-empty strict equilibrium networks, g. Here, we have two possibilities, which we analyze in turn.
(I) There are no links across groups, i.e. g i,j = 0, ∀i ∈ N x , j ∈ N y , x = y. The second observation above implies that in an equilibrium either a group is connected or disconnected. Next note that since there are no links across groups the problem for each group is analogous to the homogeneous case studied by Bala and Goyal (2000a) . Then it follows from Proposition 5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000a) that if a group is connected then it forms a periphery-sponsored star. Hence, g is either an unconnected periphery-sponsored stars network or a one-group periphery-sponsored star network. It is clear that such networks are strict equilibria only if c H >n.
(II) There are links across groups, i.e. g i,j = 1 for some i ∈ N x , j ∈ N y , x = y. It is now easy to see that g must be connected. We now prove the following: If c L ∈ (1,n) then there exists aδ < 1 such that for any δ ∈ [δ, 1) if g i,j = 1 for some i ∈ N l and j ∈ N l , l = l , then g j ,j = 1 for any j ∈ N l .
We first note that since c L > 1 any end agent (say) who is accessed by player i via g i,j = 1 sponsors his link; let g ,y 1 = 1. (We note that since c H > 1 there exists at least one such end-player distinct from j .) Second, we show that i only accesses players in N l via the link g i,j = 1. Suppose not; then there exists a player i ∈ N l accessed by i via the link g i,j = 1. Let g = g − g i,j + g i,i , it is easy to see that N i (g) = N i (g ). Thus, Π i (g) − Π i (g ) = j ∈N(i;ḡ) δ d (i,j;ḡ) − δ d(i,j;ḡ ) − (c H − c L ) < 0, as δ → 1. This contradicts Nash. Third, we show that i accesses every player in N l via g i,j = 1. Suppose not; then there exists some player N l accessed by i via some player k = j . Among such players let j be the player closest to player i and assume j accesses i via the linkḡ j ,i = 1. By construction i ∈ N l ; the previous argument implies that g i ,j = 1 and that any player accessed by i via the link g i ,j = 1 belongs to N l . Select one of the end players, say j 1 , who player i accesses via the link g i ,j = 1. Since c L > 1, player j 1 sponsors his link, say g j 1 ,y 2 = 1. Using a variant of the switching argument it is now easy to see that either  or j 1 strictly gains by deleting the link with y 1 or y 2 and creating a new link with y 2 or y 1 , respectively. This contradicts Nash. Fourth, we note that since group N l is entirely internally linked, we can use Proposition 5.4 in Bala and Goyal (2000a) to conclude that N l forms a periphery-sponsored star. Finally, it is easy to see that player j must be the center of the periphery-sponsored star; for otherwise player i strictly gains by switching from j to the central player of group N l .
Finally, we note that also group N l is entirely internally linked and therefore forms a periphery-sponsored star. Thus, if g is a strict equilibrium it is an interlinked peripherysponsored star. The proof follows. 2
